(3/3) Is an Asian NATO possible? : the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the challenges of strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific area

As the previous article covered the point of view of the different members of the Quad it is now appropriate to consider what the Quad could potentially become in the future and the role it could play in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere. In the light of our previous analyses, two very distinct scenarios seem to stand out: firstly, the evolution towards a "Quad Bloc", militarised and, especially, institutionalised in response to a bloc formed by China and Russia. Then its opposite, with the continuation of a "withdrawn Quad" that refuses to display any strategic ambition and remains strictly confined to its role as a display case for Western democracies. Finally, this article will introduce a third scenario, whose strategic dimension would certainly be mostly economic, but which would benefit from real prerogatives to impose itself in the Indo-Pacific and propose a concrete alternative to the development model promoted by China.

First of all, what would a "Quad Bloc" look like? The term Bloc refers explicitly to Cold War logics and is therefore in line with the comments made by the PRC. This implies a Quad that would formally state its objective to stand against China and would present itself as a real alliance, though more limited in size than NATO, because it is based on a smaller but more tightly knit group of countries. But to analyse this scenario in more detail, we will start with an article by John Hemmings, professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, published in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs in April 2022, in which he argues in favour of a transformation of the Quad into a real military alliance. Here, John Hemmings uses a particular definition of the term "alliance", which is that of Glenn Snyder [1] in Alliance Politics, who describes an alliance as "a formal association of states for the use of military force, in specified circumstances and against non-member states". An alliance implies a form of commitment on members’ sides and creates an obligation for them to respect the terms of the treaty or secret agreement, or not, that led to its formation. A good example of this type of political entity would be the alliance between the US and Japan or between the US and Australia. According to Hemmings, it is this type of alliance that would be required to respond to the return of an increasingly ambitious China that worries the Western bloc. Thus, drawing on the neo-realist theses of Kenneth N. Waltz [2], the author argues that democracies have an unfortunate tendency not to respond strongly enough to counter the influence of powers with clear hegemonic pretensions. He draws a parallel between the Triple Entente of 1914 and the Quad, pointing out that both are non-binding, and asserts that the Triple Entente failed to respond to the challenge of the German advance to a sufficient extent because of this hesitancy on the part of the democracies. Indeed, there is growing evidence of China's ambition, as noted in several strategic reports issued by the governments of the Quad members. For example, in 2018, the US National Defense Strategy report spoke of a PRC that "continues its military modernisation programme and seeks to achieve regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific". The Defense White Paper published by the Japanese Ministry of Defence in 2021 and the Defense Strategic Update published by its Australian counterpart a year earlier made similar observations. For his part, Xi Jinping has repeatedly urged China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) - in March 2021, January 2021 and May 2020 - to be prepared for war at any time.

The development of a Sino-Russian bloc is also an important factor in the complex equation of Indo-Pacific military cooperation. For Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow and SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korean Studies at Brookings, NATO's invitation to the Indo-Pacific countries is part of this logic and he believes that it "reflects an awareness of a deeper link between trans-Pacific security [...] due to increased cooperation between China and Russia".

A rapprochement that has been taking place for many years on the economic as well as military level with, for example, China's participation in the annual Russian military exercise since 2018. It is accompanied by a process of distancing itself from the Western bloc, which keeps accelerating and is now reaching new heights with the war in Ukraine [3].

Despite this, there are also strong counterarguments to this view: First, the viability of a real Sino-Russian alliance is far from clear. While Russia has no choice but to turn to China at the moment, it is in a particularly complex position, being unable to negotiate on an equal footing with the Chinese giant. Jae Seung Lee, professor and Jean Monnet Chair at Korea University, indeed pointed out, on the occasion of a conference held in Paris at Maison Suger, that it would be particularly complicated for Russia to assert its point of view in a world dominated by China and that its fragile position risks being rapidly exploited by the latter. Therefore, even if it seems impossible for the moment, if Russia wants to regain its independence and influence in the world it will have to find new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific area. Secondly, as explained in the previous article, the prospect of a "Quad Bloc" is very far from being unanimously accepted among Quad members, if not purely and simply unthinkable at the moment.  Unless a major event occurs that causes its more reluctant members to reassess the threat presented by China and to decide to respond militarily, it is highly unlikely that a militarisation of the Quad will take place in the coming decade. Even if the crisis in Ukraine has been a catalyst for remilitarisation in Europe and the indopacific, it is unlikely to be enough to push states to look beyond their ambitions for bilateral or trilateral alliances. Finally, making the Quad a major player in the unification of the Indo-Pacific democratic bloc would be especially intricate in this scenario. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific area are still very dependent on China economically and will inevitably be much more reluctant to join an alliance that is openly in conflict with China. This could also pose other strategic challenges with significant repercussions beyond the Indo-Pacific. In this respect, the case of South Korea is particularly interesting. At the same conference, Jae Seung Lee insisted that South Korea would most likely never seek to join a confrontational alliance with China for several reasons: The first, mainly economic, is related to supply chain issues - China produces the overwhelming majority of rare earths needed for the production of semiconductors and other high-tech products in which South Korea excels. The second, geopolitical, is that in order to negotiate with an increasingly restless North Korea, with a steadily advancing nuclear programme [4], it is necessary to maintain good relations with China on which the latter is completely dependent. The denuclearisation of North Korea, which was mentioned at this year's Quad summit in Tokyo, therefore seems unfeasible in the case of a "Quad Bloc". In short, such a development seems very unlikely at present and it is likely that it will not find any real justification in the years to come, barring exceptional events.

Does this mean that a "withdrawn Quad" as mentioned in the introduction would be preferable? Opting for the exact opposite of the "Quad Bloc" would undeniably be a step backwards for the Quad, or at least a form of continuity with what it currently is. In its current state, its prerogatives are limited to say the least, if not non-existent, given that it is an informal group and not a full-fledged institution. This greatly limits its field of action and if, in the economic field, it has already set up several aid programmes which are already effective, these initiatives still pale in comparison with associations such as ASEAN whose influence, including in this field, remains quite limited. This is even more true in the military field, where almost all progress is made at the bilateral or trilateral level, which gives the impression that the influence of the Quad is only that of the most powerful of its members and therefore does not bring any real added value. On 3 June 2022, the Quad launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), which foresees the deployment of satellites and other surveillance systems to combat illegal fishing - which China has made a speciality of, especially in the East and South China Seas - as well as the sharing of information with partner countries such as Singapore and the Solomon Islands. An apparently ambitious initiative that China, through the intermediary of its foreign minister, did not fail to criticise, arguing that the aim of the Quad with the IPMDA was to "contain China" and "make the other Asia-Pacific countries pawns of American hegemony". However, this remains an essentially preventive measure and the capacity of the states involved in this effort to concretely fight against repeated incursions into their EEZ has yet to be proven. Therefore, while this type of Quad would undoubtedly draw more candidates to participate in its expansion, it would mainly play the role of a showcase for democracies rather than that of an actor capable of imposing itself in the Indo-Pacific. It would therefore be incapable of responding to the major challenges facing the region and would undoubtedly lose most of its interest.

Nonetheless, one may now wonder whether there is an alternative path to these two extremes? Certainly, making the Quad a true military alliance seems complicated and undesirable, but an institutionalized Quad would still have a genuine potential in terms of economic strategy. On the condition that the number of member states is limited, it could allow for a much stronger economic integration of the main powers active in the Indopacific area and help them detach themselves, at least partly, from their economic dependence on China. Such a development would be far from useless on the geopolitical level by giving a broader wiggle room to countries such as India to rethink their positioning, including on the military level. Similarly, an ambitious economic and technological integration effort on the part of the Quad could provide the necessary impetus for other forms of economic cooperation currently in development, such as the IPEF or the AAGC, to compete with the PRC's "One Belt One Road" initiative. To return to South Korea, if a more frontal opposition to China could discourage it from joining a "Quad +", it could also enable it to face its supply chain problems more serenely. According to CSIS, being part of the Quad would also allow it to assert its positions on the regional and international scene, including regarding North Korea, with the support of the United States. However, the CSIS also acknowledges that this integration is necessarily conditional on the guarantee of unwavering support from the latter, given the risks that a Chinese reaction could entail. While China will not necessarily provide a concrete economic or military response, if this were to happen it is imperative for Korea and any other country aspiring to join the Quad to have the protection of Washington and of the other members of the Quad. If the Trump administration and its many foreign policy inconsistencies have permanently eroded the trust placed in the US by its allies, including South Korea, Biden's promotion of a "free, open and rules-based Indopacific" seems more in line with this need. However, as the French newspaper Le Monde underlined in an article published on 29 June 2022, "the importance of the Quad for Biden is still difficult to determine" and the value he will place on it in the face of other competing projects such as the AUKUS partnership needs to be clarified in order to be able to think about the future of the Quad.  

In conclusion, the shape the Quad will take in the future depends on many factors outside the control of states, but it is their personal stance that will ultimately determine the direction of its evolution. Without clear support and genuine leadership from the United States, it is unlikely to become institutionalised, let alone a significant player in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical order. Similarly, if India and the countries likely to join the Quad do not see the threat posed by China as outweighing the benefits of preserving their economic interest with China, it is radically impossible for the Quad to grow much larger than it is at present.

NOTES

[1] The original quote by Glenn Snyder, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, to define what an alliance is, is the following : "formal associations of states for the use of military force, in specified circumstance against states outside their own membership"

[2] The concept of neo-realism in geopolitics was developed by Kenneth N. Waltz, one of the most renowned political scientists in the field of international relations and a faculty member at UC Berkeley and Columbia, in his 1979 book Theory of international politics. This theory leaves little room for cooperation in international relations and emphasises competition and conflict as major components of the geopolitical order.

[3]It is interesting to note that already in 2021, during a visit to China by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, he expressed the importance of exiting the SWIFT system by stressing his desire to "bolster technological independence and move away from international west controlled payment system".

[4] Among the major advances made by North Korea in recent years in the field of military nuclear power, we can cite the development of the Hwasong-12 IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) in January 2021, capable of hitting Alaska, or, more recently, the Hwasong-15 ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) which could potentially hit the United States’ mainland.